Institut für Soziologie
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Social Control and Cheating

A Replication and Extension of an Experiment by Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut (DPR)



Seminar „Rational Choice Sociology“; VIU 2012

1. Introduction/Background

- Deviant behavior and norm violations occurs often in everyday life (jaywalking, fare evasion, test cheating, etc.)
- Research suggests: the degree of norm abiding behavior varies with the situation and the visibility of behavior
  - Franzen/Pointer (2012): dictator games
  - Keizer et al. (2008): broken windows
  - Milgram (1961): effects of the experimenter on obedience
- Situational cues signal social control and probability of detection/sanction:
  - norms previously broken by others
  - degree of visibility of deviant behavior

2. Experiment by DPR (2011)

2.1 Design

- Subjects roll a die in private and report the result
- The possibility to cheat was given to subjects (N = 466)
- Payoff depended on dice roll:

Spots	1	2	3	4	5	6
Payoff (CHF)	1	2	3	4	5	0

- 2 rounds: 3 different information conditions after round 1
  - no information (info0)
  - bar chart with ‚faked' dice roles (cheating clearly visible) (info1)
  - bar chart with actual dice roles of all participants in round 1 (info2)

2. Experiment by DPR (2011)

2.1 Design

- info1: ‚Faked' graph (Fischbacher & Heusi 2008)

Diese Grafik zeigt die Verteilung der Auszahlungen, die **von 389 Studierenden** der ETH und der Universität Zürich in demselben Experiment durch Würfeln ermittelt wurden.

Die **rote Linie** markiert den durchschnittlichen Anteil der Auszahlungen, der sich bei einer **grossen Zahl von zufälligen Würfelwürfen** ergeben würde.

Nachfolgend erhalten Sie die Möglichkeit erneut zu würfeln. Die Auszahlung, die Sie beim nächsten Wurf ermitteln, wird Ihnen zu Ihrer bisherigen Auszahlung dazugezählt.



2. Experiment by DPR (2011)

2.2 Results

- Remarkable deviation from fair die in both rounds in all groups (≠1/6)



Abb. 1 Die Verteilung der berichteten Auszahlungen nach dem ersten und zweiten Wurf

2. Experiment by DPR (2011)

2.2 Results

- Probability of rolling a 5 (fair die) in both rounds = 2,8%



Abb. 2 Die Verteilung der berichteten Gesamtauszahlung

2. Experiment by DPR (2011)

2.2 Results

- Info1 and info2: significantly more norm violations



Abb. 3 Differenz zwischen erster und zweiter berichteter Auszahlung nach Versuchsbedingung

3. Replication

3.1 Design

- Similar experimental setup as DPR
- Subjects roll a die in private and report the result
- The possibility to cheat was given to subjects (N = 220)
- Payoff depended on dice roll:

Spots	1	2	3	4	5	6
Payoff (€)	1	2	3	4	5	0

- 2 rounds; however, only 2 information conditions
  - no information (info0)
  - bar chart with ‚faked' dice roles (cheating clearly visible) (info1)

3. Replication

3.2 Results

- Remarkable deviation in both rounds in all groups (≠1/6)
- Similar results as DPR, but less intense



3. Replication

3.2 Results

- Probability of rolling a 5 (fair die) in both rounds = 2,8%



3. Replication

3.2 Results

- In the info conditions significantly more norm violations



3. Replication

3.3 Extension (Additional Treatments)

- Treatment ‚eyes‘

vs. neutral treatment

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- Playing together
  - Two subjects shared a die
  - They could see each others dice rolls and what they entered on the screen

3. Replication

3.3 Extension (Results)

- Treatment ‚eyes' and playing together

	payoff round 1	payoff round 2
together	-0.975**	-0.0393
	(-3.54)	(-0.14)
eyes	-0.250	0.166
	(-0.98)	(0.58)
_cons	3.276**	2.855**
	(15.08)	(12.29)
N	219	218

Note: controlled for info condition

3. Replication

3.3 Extension (Results)

- Payoff round 1 (36 pairs)



- Payoff round 2 (36 pairs)



3. Replication

3.3 Extension (Results)

- Payoff round 1 (36 pairs)



- Payoff round 2, without feedback (17 pairs)



3. Replication

3.3 Extension (Lab vs. Internet)

- Lab vs. internet





4. Conclusion

- Replication:
  - Direction of results similar to DPR, however far weaker effects
  - Already in the first round cheating over all groups
  - Probability of reporting a payoff of 0, 1 and 2 clearly underrepresented
  - Cheating from other persons cause own cheating behavior
- Extension:
  - Eyes: no significant effect on cheating behavior
  - Playing together: significant effect on cheating behavior
  - Internet: significantly more cheating than in the lab

Thank you for
your attention!