The Connection between Job Satisfaction and Relative Pay Revisited



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Motivation

- Easterlin Paradox: despite large gains in average income since the 1950s, there is no significant increase in happiness
- A large body of literature sees this as a result of social comparison: if individuals gain happiness in comparisons to peers, average income gains will amount to a zero-sum game in terms of happiness
- Empirical results support this notion (e.g. Kifle 2014 JoHS, Collischon forthcoming JoHS) using panel regression methods
- However, are these findings causal? We argue that time-constant individual factors such as motivation affect



The Easterlin Paradox



- levels of job satisfaction (which is accounted for using FE) (1)
- individual trajectories of job satisfaction (which FE does not rule out) (11)
- Fixed Effects are not enough to obtain the causal link between rel- \rightarrow ative pay and job satisfaction (Brüderl and Ludwig 2015); solution: **Fixed Effects Individual Slopes (FEIS)**

Data: Socio-Economic Panel Study (Germany)

- Pooled waves from 1984-2015; 96,113 observations for 9,884 individuals (individuals with at least 4 participations)
- Dependent variable: Job satisfaction (self-assessed, 11-point scale)
- Measure for social comparison: rank of hourly wage within the reference group (based on survey year, industry and occupation)

 $Rank_i = (I - 1)/(N - 1)$

where I is the number of individuals with wages less than the respondent and N is the number of observations within the reference group

Method: Fixed Effects Individual Slopes (FEIS)

- FE accounts for selection on levels due to unobserved heterogeneity
- FE does not account for differences in individual trends due to unobserved, time-constant heterogeneity
- We assume that individuals who are on a relatively steep wage (and thus rank) trajectory over time also experience a slower decline in job satisfaction over time (e.g. through intrinsic motivation)
- We estimate the following regression model:

 $Jobsat_{it} = z_{it}\alpha_i + \beta Rank_{it} + \gamma ln(wage)_{it} + \delta x_{it} + u_{it}$

- Controls: children, married, full-time employment, tenure, working hours, labor market experience, age, occupation (2-digit ISCO), industry (NACE top groups)
- Sample restricted to observations with at least 10 respondents in the reference group, individuals aged 19 to 65
- where $z_{it}\alpha_i$ are individual-specific slopes (in our case: age, age squared and full-time experience) and the fixed effect, β is the effect of individual rank on job satisfaction, x_{it} is a set of controls and u_{it} is the time-varying error term
- We investigate differences between short- and long-term effects using first differencing

Results					
	POLS	FE	FEIS	FD	FDIS
Rank (β)	0.204^{***} (0.062)	0.194^{***} (0.051)	0.067 (0.060)	0.124^+ (0.068)	$0.071 \\ (0.075)$
$\ln(\text{wage})(\gamma)$	0.255^{***} (0.041)	0.204^{***} (0.037)	0.305^{***} (0.049)	0.225^{***} (0.057)	0.248^{***} (0.064)
Significance levels: +	p < 0.10, * p < 0.10	< 0.05, ** p <	< 0.01, *** <i>p</i> <	(0.001 ; N*	t=96,113.

Robustness

Is FEIS necessary?



- Effects hold for reference group based on gender, education and age
- Effects hold for subsamples by employment status and gender
- Effects hold for life satisfaction as the outcome

Years befor/after crossing 90th wage percentile Years befor/after crossing 90th wage percentile

Source: SOEP v32 1984-2015.

Impact dummies show an upward trend before the event of interest that disappears in FEIS

Conclusion

- Our results show no causal link between relative pay and job satisfaction; the estimation results are not driven by larger standard errors
- We show the importance of accounting for the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on individual wage trajectories
- Individual pay gains seem to increase job satisfaction, even when accounting for individual trends in job satisfaction
- To Do: replicate the results with the PASS-ADIAB to have more reliable information on wages

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