

# A Collapse of Kindness? Repetition Effects in Laboratory Experiments.

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- Research question: Does the behaviour of subjects that participate repeatedly in experiments in one lab change over time? → repetition effects
- If yes, how can we explain this change in behaviour?

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  - Increasingly "rational" behaviour in symmetric games with pure equilibria (similar to iterated games)



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- Berger & Baumeister (2017):
  1. cognitive learning processes between two experimental sessions, even if they are months apart
  2. strong evidence for "social learning" of conditional cooperators: bad experiences turn cooperators to defectors in a PD, but ...

## Open Questions

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- ... a sizeable amount of cooperators "turn heel" without having experienced defection by alter.
- This effect seems to occur in addition to cognitive and/or social learning processes,
- A change of preferences occurs.
- We term this effect the "**Collapse of Kindness**"
- Can we reproduce this effect?

# Design and Treatment

	May/June 2016	October/November 2016	January/February 2017
G1	$O_1$	$O_2$	$(O_3)$
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- Anonymity treatment in 4 Levels: low, typical, high, online









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  - "Beliefs" and strategic considerations are irrelevant, game is as simple as it gets
  - Equilibrium: A ("Dictator") makes smallest possible offer
  - Suitable as a direct measurement of "Kindness"
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- Order of played games was randomized, as was the game and role to be payed off
- Concluding questionnaire: demographics, motivation, trust scale, risk scale, patience, etc.

- Teilnehmer A erhält 10,00 Euro von der Studienleitung.
- Teilnehmer A teilt diesen Betrag zwischen sich und Teilnehmer B auf.
- Dabei kann Teilnehmer A dem Teilnehmer B einen Betrag zwischen 0,00 und 10,00 Euro zuteilen.
- Teilnehmer B erhält den zugeteilten Betrag.
- Teilnehmer A erhält den Rest.

Hier ein Beispielvideo:



Sie bearbeiten diese Aufgabe als Teilnehmer A.

Ihnen wird dabei ein Studienteilnehmer anonym zugelost.

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Sie bearbeiten diese Aufgabe als Teilnehmer A.

Ihnen wird dabei ein Studienteilnehmer anonym zugelost.

**Sie sind Teilnehmer A.**

Bitte teilen Sie die 10,00 Euro auf.

Welchen Betrag teilen Sie Teilnehmer B zu?


0,00 Euro	1,00 Euro	2,00 Euro	3,00 Euro	4,00 Euro	5,00 Euro	6,00 Euro	7,00 Euro	8,00 Euro	9,00 Euro	10,00 Euro
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## Who returned?

- In  $O_1$ : 484 subjects
- $G_1$ ,  $O_2$ : 116
- $G_2$ ,  $O_2$ : 106
- 46% of all subjects returned, relatively even split into both groups

Logit, DV: Returned to repeated experiment (yes, no)




Additional controls: payoff game & role, first game played, field of study

## Selection Effects: Miscellanea...


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- field of study: stem-students return more often, aspiring social scientists less often



# OLS, DV: Difference in Decisions between both Observations



Additional controls: payoff game & role in O1, field of study

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- less "irrational" subjects in repeated experiments (between and within!, holds true for bonus observation  $O_3$ )
- Total time needed decreases from initially 13 min to about 9-10 min after one repetition (no further reduction in  $O_3$ )

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- Theoretical framework still missing!


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
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- Do not interpret marginals from laboratory experiments!
- Control for "game rats"


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



## UG: MAO of Responder















### TG: Transfer by Trustor



### UG: MAO of Responder

