Disentangling people's fairness of earnings evaluations using distributional survey experiments

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Background

Three kids, one flute

Anne says the flute should be hers because only she can play it. Bob says the flute should be his because he has no other toys. Carla says the flute is hers because she made it. How do we decide who should have the flute?

- need,
- equality, and
- merit.
- ⇒ People are usually guided by more than one principle at a time.
- ⇒ Decision further depends on the wider context, the specific situation, and characteristics of the receiver (Deutsch 1975; Fiske 1993; Miller 2003; Auspurg, Hinz, and Sauer 2017; Gilgen 2022).
- ⇒ Existing studies have a narrow focus on one principle, situation, or subpopulation.

Research questions

- How do people balance effort, needs, within-firm position, and ascriptive characteristics (gender and ethnic background) to decide upon just earnings of employees?
- Whow do these allocations translate into unequal earnings distributions and whose choices decrease or increase inequality?

Background

Hypotheses

- Hypothesis 1 People not only consider need, merit, and equality as guiding principles but they also resort to heuristics and use ascriptive characteristics when distributing salaries.
- Hypothesis 2 Discriminatory allocations are more likely among more privileged groups (men without a migration background and with a higher income) to maintain and justify their relative advantage. → Ingroup-favouritism
- Hypothesis 3 To reduce cognitive dissonance, people in more advantageous positions (income, class position) tend to distribute more unequally. \rightarrow Self-serving bias

Data and Methods

Data

- MOSAiCH 2019 (within ISSP)
- $N \approx 2'000$
- Includes a distributional survey experiment (DSE)
- DSEs combine the *D*-efficient design of a choice experiment with an active distributional task as is common in lab experiments (Gilgen 2022).

[Introductory Text]

How would you distribute the money available for salaries among the three hospital employees described below?

[Example DSE]

Whom would you want to assign what salary, given a total sum of CHF 18'000? Everyone of the employees works full-time at the hospital.

| | David Moser | Leila Osman | Tamara Dugandjic |
|--|--------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| Private life | lives with partner | single | lives with partner |
| Children | no children | no children | 2 children |
| Health | in poor health | in poor health | in good health |
| Job at the company | cleaner | nurse | doctor |
| Effort at work according to last job reference | very high | sometimes more, sometimes less | not very high |
| salary | + | + | = |

Figure 1: Example DSE

| Dimension | Levels | | |
|-----------------------|---|--|--|
| Gender | 1 male; 2 female | | |
| Ethnic background | 1 Swiss name; 2 Slavic name; 3 Arabic name | | |
| Relationship status | 1 lives with partner; 2 lives alone | | |
| Children in household | 1 no children; 2 two children | | |
| Health | 1 poor health; 2 good health | | |
| Profession | 1 cleaner; 2 nurse; 3 medical doctor | | |
| Dodication to job | 1 not very dedicated; 2 sometimes more, sometimes less dedicated; | | |
| Dedication to job | 3 very dedicated | | |

• Fractional factorial of 72 vignettes (*D*-efficiency of 98.9) in 24 different choice sets. Random allocation of one choice set to each respondent.

Pros of the setup

- Active task close to real-world situation where finite resources are allocated to people described using uncorrelated attributes
- Higher external validity compared to classic population in laboratory experiments (i.e., students of psychology or economics)
- Set up as a choice experiment but with a linear outcome measure such as in a factorial survey experiment
- Account for the inherent interdependence of outcomes while generating more fine-grained data compared to a choice experiment

Analytical strategy

- Who gets how much? → Amount distributed, vignettes
- 2 Who distributes more unequally? \rightarrow Gini, respondents
- ⇒ OLS with clustered SE (fixed variance at respondent level because of fixed total)

Results — Who gets how much?






Figure 2: Distributing salaries among vignette people

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Results — Ingroup-favouritism by gender?



Results — Ingroup-favouritism by ethnic background?



Who distributes more unequally?




Figure 3: Gini among vignettes as dependent variable

Conclusions

- People consider both need and merit when distributing money among hypothetical employees.
 - ► They reward effort as well as need (if the vignette person has children but not if the person is in bad health).
- Discrimination & Ingroup-favouritism:
 - ▶ Respondents distribute less to minorities and women, and especially discriminate against men with a minority background.
 - ▶ Respondents with higher incomes take from the lower status professions and give it to the person with the highest status position (medical doctor).

Conclusions

- Self-serving bias:
 - ▶ Respondents with no migration background allocate higher sums to vignette people who also do not have a migration background
 - \rightarrow especially when male respondents evaluate a male vignette person.
 - ▶ People in socio-economically more advantageous positions distribute more unequally
 - ▶ this results in distributions with a higher Gini coefficient across the three evaluated vignettes.
 - Those in favor of more redistributive measures tend to allocate salaries more equally.
- DSEs a promising alternative for assessing people's allocation decisions more generally.
- Repeat to investigate whether something stuck from the COVID-related discussion on the pay of essential workers.

Thank you for listening! Looking forward to your questions and comments

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