

LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN WORKSHOP "ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS"

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Equal Housing for Everyone? (Weak) Double Standards for Migrants in Fairness of Housing Evaluations

Felix Wolter

LMU Munich





- 1. Motivation and Research Questions
- 2. Theoretical Considerations
- 3. Research and Study Design
- 4. Results: Fairness of Housing Evaluations and Ethnic Origin
- 5. Discussion





Motivation: Residential Inequality and Discrimination

- Residential inequality with respect to various dimensions and indicators (Cohen Raviv & Hinz 2022; Kolb 2013; Mulder et al. 2015; Galster & Wessel 2019; Holm et al. 2021; Diekmann et al. 2022; Rüttenauer 2019; Rüttenauer & Best 2021).
- Ethnic discrimination in housing markets:
 - Supply side: access to housing (Auspurg et al. 2019; Best & Rüttenauer 2018; Horr et al. 2019; Sawert 2020).
 - Price discrimination? (Ihlanfeldt & Maycock 2009; Winke 2016; Eilers et al. 2021)
 - Demand side: discriminatory residential preferences:
 - US: racial residential segregation (e.g., "white flight") (Emerson et al. 2001; Kye 2018; Lewis et al. 2011)
 - For Germany: Wolter et al. (2023).



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- Some stylized figures:
 - 21%—34% positive response rates by landlords for minorities in field experiments, 40% RR for non-minorities (meta-analysis by Auspurg et al. 2019).
 - Homeownership: migrants 33%, non-migrants 55% (D 2010; Reimann 2018; Kolb 2013).
 - Living space per capita: migrants 34 m², non-migrants 50 m² (D 2018; Holm et al. 2018).
 - Migrants pay 11 € higher rents than non-migrants, of which 7 € are not explained by structural differences (D 2016; Winke 2016).



Research Questions

- What is considered "fair" in terms of housing?
- How do people perceive residential inequality with respect to distributive justice principles? (e.g., Reeskens & van Oorschot 2013):
 - Equity / merit
 - Need
 - Status entitlement
 - [Equality]



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This paper:

Do people take ethnic origin into account when making fairness of housing evaluations?

- Entitlement or discriminatory main effect:
 Less favorable housing conditions accorded to ethnic minorities?
- Double standards:
 Merit and need principles, and reward schemes applied differently by ethnic origin?
- Exploratorily:
 Different evaluation patterns in dependence of respondents' own ethnic origin?



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Theoretical Considerations: Status Entitlement, Discrimination

- Status entitlement:
 - Originally rooted in expectation states theory, status characteristics theory, rewards expectations theory (Berger et al. 2014, Berger/Fişek 2006, Correll, Ridgeway 2003, Fişek/Hysom 2008).
 - Beliefs emerge that relate status characteristics to performance expectations, and in turn to norms on reward expectations (Auspurg et al. 2017).
 - Some groupings deserve more because of their anticipated positioning on the social ladder.



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- Discrimination (Arrow 1973; Becker 1971); Phelps 1972):
 - Taste-based:
 - Economics: personal utility function, no statements on origin of these preferences.
 - Other arguments: cultural distance (Czymara & Schmidt-Catran 2016), ethnic hierarchization (Hagendoorn 1995), group-threat (Quillian 1995).
 - Statistical:
 - Missing information when making fairness evaluations: is this person *really* entitled to a certain gratification?
 - Status characteristics or group membership as proxies for missing information.



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H1: Less favorable housing conditions considered "fair" for ethnic minority members



Theoretical Considerations: Double Standards

- Extension of status entitlement reasoning.
- Again, rooted in expectation states theory and its sub-theories (see above).
- Main assumptions (Foschi 1996, 2000):
 - People attribute different degrees of importance to factors that are relevant for deciding about the allocation of rewards (e.g., merit, need), dependent on ascribed or achieved status characteristics or group membership.
 - Stricter standards for disadvantaged groups.

H2: Merit, need, and reward scheme (housing conditions) applied more strictly to ethnic minority members.



Theoretical Considerations: Respondents' Own Ethnic Background

- Argument 1 taken from "same-genderreferent hypothesis" (Auspurg et al. 2017):
 - "Just gender wage gap" literature: women observe lower earnings for women in their (female-dominated) working environments and infer that this is normal and fair.
 - Similarily, ethnic minorities in housing markets could observe factually worse housing conditions for this group and adapt their benchmarks accordingly.
- Argument 2: taste-based discrimination, ingroup-out-group-effect.



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- Three competing hypotheses:
 - H3a: "Blindness effect":
 Ethnic minority members accord <u>less</u>
 favorable housing conditions to <u>everyone</u>.
 - H3b: "What is becomes what ought to be effect": Ethnic minority members accord <u>less</u> favorable housing conditions to ethnic <u>minority members</u>.
 - H3c: In-group favoritism:
 Ethnic minority members accord more favorable housing conditions to their in-group.



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Study Design

- Survey specs:
 - Nationwide (Germany) access panel survey (Bilendi)
 - Fall 2022
 - Quotas for education, age, gender, federal state
 - N = 3,197
 - Speeders excluded (3% fastest)
- FS Experiment:
 - Respondents rate example residential constellations of fictitious households with respect to perceived fairness.
 - Vignette dimensions:
 - Ethnic origin: household name
 - Merit / equity
 - Need
 - Housing situation / reward scheme



Study Design: Example Vignette

The Schulz household consists of two adult persons without children and performs rather low professionally.

The household lives in a high-rise building for rent, the living space is spacious with plenty of room.

Housing costs, including heating and electricity and all other running costs, are financed mainly by *state assistance pay- ments* and are *very high*.

Is this household's housing situation <u>fair</u>, or do you think the housing situation is <u>unfairly too bad</u> or <u>unfairly too good</u>?

Unfair: too bad					Fair					Unfair: too good
-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5



Study Design: Vignette Universe

No.	Dimension	Levels
1	Ethnic origin	Schulz / Yilmaz / Larsson / Al Harbi
2	Household size/partner	One adult single / adult couple
3	Number of children	0/1/2/3
4	Job performance	High / low / empty (no information)
5	House type	High-rise building / multi-family house (4 parties) / detached single-family house
6	Owner status	Homeowner / renter
7	Living space	Cramped / average / spacious with plenty of room
8	Source of financing	Own earned income / inheritance / State assistant payments
9	Housing costs	Very low / neither low nor high / very high



Sample Characteristics

Variable		Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Fairness rating		0.19	2.02	-5	5	25,488
Migration background:	no yes, other yes, Turkish/Arab	80.87 16.09 3.04		0 0 0	1 1 1	3,158 3,158 3,158
Gender female	0.50		0	1	3,197	
Age	49.06	15.76	18	75	3,197	
Education (years, gen-	13.60	2.98	7	22	3,197	
East Germany	0.17		0	1	3,197	
Homeowner		0.39		0	1	3,197




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Main Effects of Vignette Dimensions





Double Standards: Ethnic Origin × Merit, Need, and Housing Situation

		"Yilmaz"	"Larsson"	"Al Harbi"
Merit	Job performance	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Source of financing	yes, weak	n.s.	yes, weak
Need	Household size (partner)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Number of children	yes, weak	yes, weak (outl.)	yes, weak
Housing situation	House type	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Owner status	yes, very weak	n.s.	n.s.
	Living space	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Housing costs	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Note: Reported are results of interaction effects between the non-German sounding family name (with reference German family name) and the respective independent vignette variable in the second column. The dependent variable is the fairness rating of the vignette setup. Each interaction was estimated in a separate model.




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


Double Standards: Ethnic Origin × Source of Financing





Double Standards: Ethnic Origin × Children





	b	SE	p-value
Ethnic origin (0 = Schulz):			
Yilmaz	0.135	0.037	0.000
Larsson	0.040	0.035	0.249
Al Harbi	0.119	0.037	0.001
Respondent migration background (0 = no):			
yes, other	0.147	0.083	0.077
yes, Turkish or Arab	-0.451	0.228	0.000
Interactions:			
Yilmaz x other	0.025	0.093	0.792
Yilmaz x Turkish or Arab	0.541	0.244	0.027
Larsson x other	0.030	0.088	0.736
Larsson x Turkish or Arab	0.400	0.228	0.080
Al Harbi x other	0.020	0.087	0.816
Al Harbi x Turkish or Arab	0.462	0.222	0.037



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


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Ethnic Origin Effects on Fairness Evaluations by Respondent Origin





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Key Findings

	Hypothesis	Assumed Effect on Fairness of Housing Evaluation	Result
H1	Discriminatory main effect	Less favorable housing conditions for ethnic minority members	Yes, but substantially weak
H2	Double standards for merit, need, reward scheme	Merit, need, and reward scheme applied more strictly to ethnic minority members	Yes for 2 out of 8, but substantially weak
НЗа	Blindness effect	Ethnic minority members accord less favorable housing conditions to everyone	No
H3b	What is becomes what ought to be	Ethnic minority members accord less favorable housing conditions to ethnic minority members	Yes
НЗс	In-group favoritism	Ethnic minority members accord more favorable housing conditions to their in-group	No



Limitations

- Limitations in this study:
 - Restricted FS setup:
 - Number of dimensions included
 - Qualitative vignette dimensions only
 - ...
 - Social desirability?
 - Effects of Turkish/Arab respondents:
 - Causality?
 - Small N, low power



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- Robustness checks:
 - Delete middle answer category of DV ☑
 - Introduce several controls to CLI models ☑
 - Retain only first 4 vignettes answered
 - Conduct complete-case analysis ☑



Limitations and Outlook

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- General things to consider, outlook:
 - More research on fairness of housing perceptions! Replications and extensions!
 - Take into account local housing market conditions
 - FS with between-respondents-design to tackle social desirability?



Thank you very much!

Dr. Felix Wolter
Department of Sociology, LMU Munich
felix.wolter@lmu.de





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Appendix Slides






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White Flight Phenomenon in the US



Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_flight#/media/File:Gary,_Indiana_racial_demographics.webp



FS Module: Intro Screen

Im Folgenden geht es darum, welche <u>Wohnbedingungen</u> in Deutschland von den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern als gerecht wahrgenommen werden und inwieweit der Staat für gerechtere Wohnverhältnisse sorgen sollte.

Dazu stellen wir Ihnen 8 verschiedene <u>fiktive Haushalte und deren</u> <u>Wohnverhältnisse</u> mit zufällig zusammengestellten Merkmalen vor.

Bitte stellen Sie sich vor, die erwachsenen Haushaltspersonen sind mittleren Alters (Anfang 40 Jahre) und wohnen in Ihrer Region. Die Wohnverhältnisse sind jeweils eine Kombination aus Gebäudeart, Miete oder Eigentum, Wohnfläche sowie den Wohnkosten.

Uns interessiert zum einen, <u>wie gerecht</u> die dargestellte Wohnsituation für den jeweiligen Haushalt Ihrer Meinung nach ist: Sind die Wohnverhältnisse <u>gerecht</u> oder <u>ungerecht schlecht</u> bzw. <u>ungerecht gut</u>?

Zum anderen würden wir gerne wissen, ob der Staat bei diesem Haushalt für <u>bessere Wohnverhältnisse</u> bzw. für <u>weniger vorteilhafte</u> <u>Wohnverhältnisse</u> sorgen sollte, oder ob der Staat bei diesem Haushalt nicht eingreifen sollte.



Beispielhaushalt 69:

Der Haushalt Al Harbi besteht aus einer erwachsenen Person ohne Kinder, und leistet beruflich eher wenig.

Der Haushalt wohnt in einem Mehrfamilienhaus mit 4 Parteien und ist Wohneigentümer, die Wohnfläche ist großzügig mit viel Platz.

Die Wohnkosten inklusive Heizung und Strom und allen anderen Nebenkosten werden hauptsächlich durch staatliche Unterstützungszahlungen finanziert und sind sehr hoch.

Ist die Wohnsituation dieses Haushalts gerecht oder ist die Wohnsituation Ihrer Meinung nach ungerecht zu schlecht bzw. ungerecht zu gut?

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Ungerecht:					Gerecht					Ungerecht:
zu schlecht										zu gut
\circ	\bigcirc	\circ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	\circ



Analysis Strategy

- Standard multilevel regression approach (Hox 2010)
- Dependent variable = vignette fairness rating [−5...0...+5]
- Step 1: Main effects of vignette variables
 → ethnic origin main effect?
- Step 2: Interaction vignette ethnic origin x remaining vignette variables
 → double standards?
- Step 3: Cross-level interactions: respondent ethnic origin × vignette ethnic origin
 → In-group / out-group effects?



Study Design: Vignette Setup

- Fixed in the vignette intro:
 - Household adults' age = 40 years old
 - Household lives "in your region"
- Vignette universe = $2^2 \times 3^5 \times 4^2$ design = 15,552 vignettes
- D-efficient vignette sample:
 - 576 vignettes
 - 72 decks
 - 8 vignettes/respondent, randomized order
 - D = 98.3
 - All 2nd order interactions orthogonalized
 - No exclusion of (potentially) implausible vignettes

